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Capacity Dynamics and Endogenous Asymmetries In Firm Size
Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial and persistent differences in the sizes of firms in most
industries. We propose a dynamic model of capacity accumulation that is consistent with the observed facts.
The model highlights the mode of product market competition and the extent of investment reversibility as
key determinants of the size distribution of firms in an industry. In particular, if firms compete in prices and
the rate of depreciation is large, then the industry moves toward an outcome with one dominant firm and one
small firm. Industry dynamics in this case resemble a preemption race. Contrary to the usual intuition, this
preemption race becomes more brutal as investment becomes more reversible.
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1 Extensions and Generalizations
1.1 Cost/Benefit Considerations and Asymmetric Industry Structures
Asymmetries arise and persist provided that one firm has a strategic advantage over the
other. The tangible form of this advantage is that one firm can get the other to stop invest-
ing. In Section 4 of the paper, we have shown that this is the case under price competition
because a firm’s profits from product market competition peak in its own capacity. Below
we show that cost/benefit considerations can give rise to a strategic advantage and hence
asymmetries irrespective of the mode product market competition, but that the dynamics
of the industry hinge on the source of the strategic advantage. In particular, the possibility
of gaining a strategic advantage based on cost/benefit considerations does not lead to a
preemption race.
Benefit of Capacity. Roughly speaking, the benefit of adding a block of capacity is
determined by the increase in profits from product market competition that results from
an increase in capacity.1 Recall that demand is given by Q(P ) = a − bP or, equivalently,
P (Q) = ab − Qb . An increase in b thus causes an inward rotation of demand around the
maximum quantity a. That is, holding a fixed, increasing b corresponds to decreasing
consumers’ willingness to pay. In fact, profits pi(i, j) from product market competition are
inversely proportional to b, and the marginal benefit of capacity therefore decreases with b.
∗Evanston, IL 60208-2009, U.S.A., d-besanko@kellogg.northwestern.edu.
†Stanford, CA 94305-6010, U.S.A., doraszelski@hoover.stanford.edu.
1The nature of our argument here is more suggestive than formal because it is in fact the value function
that determines the marginal benefit of capacity (see equation (4) in the paper). At the same time, however,
the value function reflects not only the policy function but also the profits from product market competition.
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In other words, if consumers’ willingness to pay is low, the marginal benefit of capacity is
low.
Table 1 lists the most likely long-run industry structures under quantity and price com-
petition for various values of b.2 Throughout, we hold the rate of depreciation fixed at
δ = 0.1. As can be seen, decreasing b relative to our baseline parameterization of b = 10
most likely most likely
industry structure industry structure
b under quantity competition under price competition
0.1 (5,5) (3,9), (9,3)
1 (5,5) (3,9), (9,3)
10 (4,4) (2,8), (8,2)
15 (3,3) (2,7), (7,2)
20 (3,3) (0,7), (7,0)
50 (0,4), (4,0) (0,4), (4,0)
100 (0,0) (0,0)
Table 1: Most likely industry structures. Quantity and price competition.
changes little. This is in line with our intuition: If consumers’ willingness to pay is high,
the marginal benefit of capacity is high. Hence, firms have a strong incentive to forestall
depreciation by holding extra capacity. Similarly, increasing b from 10 to 20 changes lit-
tle. Increasing b further to 50, however, produces a noticeable change: Now there is an
asymmetry under both modes of product market competition. In fact, one firm accumu-
lates enough capacity to supply the monopoly quantity, the other no capacity at all. With
b = 100, finally, we have x(i, j) = 0 for all i and j. Hence, a symmetric (albeit trivial)
industry structure arises. The reason is that consumers’ willingness to pay is already so low
that adding capacity is simply not worthwhile.
How does an asymmetric industry structure come about under quantity competition?
Figure 1 shows the policy function and limiting distribution in case of b = 20 and b = 50.
With b = 20, the limiting distribution is unimodal with a mode at state (3, 3). The reason
is that a firm cannot gain a strategic advantage over its rival: i ≤ 3 implies x(i, j) > 0
for all j. This is in line with our analysis of capacity-constrained quantity competition in
Section 3 of the paper. With b = 50, by contrast, a firm has a strategic motive to invest as
it can now deter its rival from investing by growing large. In particular, x(0, j) > 0 if j ≤ 2
and x(0, j) = 0 if j ≥ 3. That is, a medium-sized or large firm has a strategic advantage
over a small rival because the smaller firm stops to invest if it is sufficiently far behind. One
therefore expects the industry to evolve towards an asymmetric structure, and indeed the
limiting distribution is bimodal with modes at states (0, 4) and (4, 0).
2Decreasing a has very similar effects to increasing b. Here we focus on b because a cannot be meaningfully
increased without adjusting the capacity grid. To see this, note that, say, the Cournot quantity qD = a
3
is
increasing in a but independent of b.
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To better understand what is going on, consider again the single-period profit function
under quantity competition as shown in the left panel of Figure 3 and tabulated in Table 5
(up to scale). The key point to note here is that the marginal benefit of capacity (weakly)
decreases in the rival’s capacity.3 Consequently, when competing against a medium-sized
or large firm, a small firm has a weak incentive to invest and, in fact, may choose not to
invest at all. This is the source of the strategic advantage that a medium-sized or large firm
enjoys over a small rival. Finally, turning from b = 50 to b = 20, the marginal benefit of
capacity goes up. But if consumers’ willingness to pay is high enough, the marginal benefit
of capacity more than outweighs the cost irrespective of the rival’s capacity. Hence, neither
firm is able to gain a strategic advantage over the other, and a symmetric industry structure
results.
While the industry structure may be alike, the industry dynamics hinge on the source
of the strategic advantage. In particular, the possibility of gaining a strategic advantage
based on cost/benefit considerations does not lead to a preemption race. Instead, one of
the firms is stuck forever with zero capacity. To see this, consider the marginal distribution
of states (i, j) after T = 5, 15, 25, 50 periods, starting from state (0, 0) (not shown). Under
quantity competition with b = 50, the modes of the marginal distribution are states (0, 1)
and (0, 1) after T = 5 periods; states (0, 3) and (3, 0) after T = 15 periods; and states (0, 4)
and (4, 0) after T = 25 and T = 50 periods. In sum, the smaller firm is trapped in its
marginal position.
Instead of engaging in a drawn-out preemption race, firms barely put up a fight for
market dominance. Suppose the industry starts in state (0, 0) with both firms investing
5.05. If Firm 1 gets the lead, it increases its investment to 6.74 and Firm 2 decreases its
investment to 3.01. This most likely moves the industry from state (1, 0) to state (2, 0),
where Firm 1 and Firm 2 decrease their investments to 5.41 and 1.01, respectively. But once
the industry moves on to state (3, 0), Firm 2 stops investing. In other words, investment is
too low to even make sure that a firm leaves the initial zero-capacity state behind. This,
of course, contrasts sharply with the heavy investment under capacity-constrained price
competition.
Cost of Capacity. We now turn from the benefit to the cost of capacity (as embodied in
the transition probabilities). Recall that we choose the effectiveness of investment α given
the rate of depreciation δ such that the probability of success equals θ¯ at an investment of
x¯, i.e., α = θ
(1−δ−θ)x¯ . Given our baseline parameterization of x¯ = 20 and θ¯ = 0.5, the cost
of a 50-percent-chance of adding a block of capacity is therefore 20. To put these numbers
into perspective, recall that the monopoly quantity corresponds to 4 blocks of capacity
and that the monopoly profit is 40. Clearly, a higher cost of adding a block of capacity
goes hand-in-hand with a lower effectiveness of investment because x¯ and α are inversely
3With the exception of state (2, 2) to be precise.
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proportional. We focus on x¯ in what follows because it is easier to interpret than α.
Table 2 lists the most likely long-run industry structures under quantity and price com-
petition for various values of x. Strikingly, the entries in Table 2 are identical to the ones
most likely most likely
industry structure industry structure
x¯ under quantity competition under price competition
0.2 (5,5) (3,9), (9,3)
2 (5,5) (3,9), (9,3)
20 (4,4) (2,8), (8,2)
30 (3,3) (2,7), (7,2)
40 (3,3) (0,7), (7,0)
100 (0,4), (4,0) (0,4), (4,0)
200 (0,0) (0,0)
Table 2: Most likely industry structures. Quantity and price competition.
in Table 1. Of course, this does not imply that, say, doubling x¯ is equivalent to doubling b.
In fact, the investment policy with b = 10 and x¯ = 40 is different from the one with b = 20
and x¯ = 20. However, these differences are small, indicating that the same mechanism is at
work in both cases. In particular, with x¯ = 100, there is again an asymmetry under quantity
as well as price competition. This time, however, it arises not because the marginal benefit
of capacity is low but because the cost is high. Finally, with x¯ = 200, the marginal cost
of capacity is already so high that adding capacity is simply not worthwhile and we again
have x(i, j) = 0 for all i and j.
Pakes & McGuire’s (1994) Quality Ladder Model. Cost/benefit considerations are
the driving force in Pakes & McGuire’s (1994) quality ladder model. In their model, the
product market is characterized by price competition with differentiated products. Firms
invest to increase the quality of their product. There is an outside good. The industry is
hit by a shock once the quality of the outside good goes up. Given the functional form of
demand, this translates into a (potential) decrease in the quality of all inside goods.
There are three similarities between Pakes & McGuire’s (1994) quality ladder model and
our capacity accumulation model with capacity-constrained quantity competition. First,
depending on the parameterization, both models may lead to a symmetric or an asym-
metric industry structure. Second, just like capacity-constrained quantity competition,
cost/benefit considerations give rise to a strategic advantage in Pakes & McGuire’s (1994)
quality ladder model. Third, again just like capacity-constrained quantity competition, the
possibility of gaining a strategic advantage does not lead to a preemption race in Pakes &
McGuire’s (1994) quality ladder model. Instead, one of the firms is stuck forever with a
good of the lowest possible quality.
Turning to our model of capacity accumulation with price competition, recall that a
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firm’s profits from product market competition peak in its own capacity. Consequently, it
is often better for the small firm to be considerably smaller than the large firm rather than
to be slightly smaller. Cost/benefit considerations therefore play a minor role in our model.
In fact, because more capacity leads to less profits, in our model the small firm would be
better off staying put rather than trying to grow even if capacity were costless. For the
same reason it is also in the self-interest of a firm to withdraw capacity from the industry
once it has lost the preemption race, which is precisely why firms engage in the preemption
race in the first place. In this sense, both the strategic advantage that renders asymmetries
persistent and the preemption race that is fought to determine the identity of the industry
leader are intimately connected to the nature of capacity-constrained price competition.
This differs markedly from Pakes & McGuire’s (1994) quality ladder model.
1.2 Product Differentiation
Up to this point, we have focused on product market competition with homogeneous prod-
ucts. Turning to the opposite extreme of independent goods, it should be clear that asym-
metric industry structures can no longer arise: After all, with independent goods, both
firms are monopolists, and each firm therefore accumulates enough capacity to supply the
monopoly quantity.
The question then is: What happens in intermediate cases? To answer this question,
we incorporate product differentiation into our model of price competition. This allows us
to study how the degree of product differentiation affects the structure of an industry.
Unfortunately, there is no “off-the-shelf” model of capacity-constrained price competi-
tion with differentiated products. Below we therefore derive the single-period profit func-
tions from first principles. In doing so, we replace the “hard” capacity constraints of Kreps &
Scheinkman (1983), Deneckere & Kovenock (1996), and Allen, Deneckere, Faith & Kovenock
(2000) with “soft” capacity constraints. Hard capacity constraints imply that the cost of
producing beyond capacity is infinite. With soft capacity constraints, on the other hand, a
firm can produce any quantity, albeit at an exploding cost. This is in line with the notion
that capacity choice is really a choice of scale that determines the cost structures of firm
and thus sets the conditions for price competition (Tirole 1988, p. 218). This in turn sug-
gests that the idiosyncratic shocks to firms’ capacities that play such an important role in
shaping industries are really tantamount to cost shocks.
Soft capacity constraints offer an additional advantage: They allow us to assume that
firms have a “common carrier requirement”. That is, a firm is obliged to satisfy all of its
demand, it cannot turn away customers. This avoids specifying a rationing scheme and
gives rise to a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in the product market game (see Maggi
(1996b) among others).
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Demand. The utility-maximization problem of the representative consumer is given by
max
q0≥0,q1≥0,q2≥0
q0 + αq1 + αq2 − β2 q
2
1 −
β
2
q22 − γβq1q2
subject to the budget constraint q0 + p1q1 + p2q2 = y, where q0 is the nume´raire good and
y the consumer’s income. γ ∈ [0, 1) measures the degree of product differentiation, ranging
from zero for independent goods to unity for homogeneous goods (perfect substitutes).
Solving the utility-maximization problem yields the linear demand system
q1(p1, p2) =
1
1− γ2 (a(1− γ)− bp1 + γbp2) ,
q2(p1, p2) =
1
1− γ2 (a(1− γ)− bp2 + γbp1) ,
where a = αβ and b =
1
β . This specification was originally proposed by Bowley (1924)
and has subsequently been used by Spence (1976) and Dixit (1979) to model differentiated
product oligopolies. Note that there are no income effects because utility is quasilinear.
Letting P = p1+p22 be the average price, aggregate demand q1(p1, p2)+ q2(p1, p2) can be
written as Q(P ) = 21+γ (a− bP ). Our earlier demand specification for homogeneous goods
(equation (1) in the paper) is thus the limit of the above demand system for differentiated
goods. For this reason, we retain a = 40 and b = 10 from the case of homogenous goods,
but vary the degree of product differentiation by choosing γ ∈ {0.9, 0.7}. The top left and
bottom left panels of Figure 2 show the resulting profits from product market competition.
Soft Capacity Constraints. Given that a firm holds q > 0 units of capacity, we assume
that the total cost of producing q units of output is
c(q, q) =
1
1 + η
(
q
q
)η
q,
where η > 0 measures the severity of the capacity constraint. The larger is η, the closer
we are to hard capacity constraints: marginal cost,
(
q
q
)η
, remains small as long as q < q
(because
(
q
q
)η → 0 as η → ∞), but becomes large once q > q (because ( qq)η → ∞ as
η →∞).
Since total cost is not defined at zero capacity, we set M = 9 with q1 = 5, q2 = 10
up to q9 = 45 in what follows. We set η = 10 to approximate hard capacity constraints.
If q = q3 = 15, for example, then marginal cost is essentially zero as long as output is
below 12.5 units (about 83 percent of capacity). Marginal cost then rises gradually in a
neighborhood of capacity, and finally increases sharply once output is in excess of 16 units
(about 107 percent of capacity). Finally, we hold the rate of depreciation fixed at δ = 0.1.
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Price Competition. Suppose that firms’ capacities are given by (qi, qj) and that they
compete in the product market by setting prices (p1, p2). Because firms produce to satisfy
demand, the profit-maximization problem for, say, Firm 1 is given by
max
p1≥0
p1q1(p1, p2)− c(q1(p1, p2), qi).
Firm 1’s profit-maximization problem and the corresponding problem for Firm 2 give rise
to a system of FOCs. The Nash equilibrium can be computed easily by numerically solving
this system.
Results. Figure 2 shows the profits from product market competition, policy functions,
and limiting distributions for γ ∈ {0.9, 0.7}. If γ = 0.9, the policy function is reminiscent
of the one we obtain under price competition, while it resembles the one that arises under
quantity competition if γ = 0.7. In other words, how much a firm invests depends critically
on its rival’s capacity if the degree of product differentiation is low (i.e., γ = 0.9, see top
middle panel), whereas a firm’s investment is fairly insensitive to its rival’s capacity if it is
high (i.e., γ = 0.7, see bottom middle panel). In particular, industry dynamics resemble
a preemption race if the degree of product differentiation is low, and the industry evolves
towards an asymmetric structure (top right panel). In contrast, the industry evolves towards
a symmetric structure if the degree of product differentiation is high (bottom right panel).
Table 3 lists the most likely long-run industry structures along with the corresponding
cross-price elasticities for various values of γ. As can be seen, the cross-price elasticities are
declining rapidly with the degree of product differentiation, whereas the size differences are
declining slowly as we move away from homogeneous goods. In sum, asymmetric industry
structures arise and persist as long as products are not too differentiated.
most likely cross-price elasticity cross-price elasticity
γ industry structure of small firm of large firm
0.95 (1,5), (5,1) 20.56 4.62
0.9 (1,5), (5,1) 10.54 2.61
0.8 (3,4), (4,3) 1.62 1.37
0.7 (4,4) 0.87 0.87
0.5 (4,4) 0.57 0.57
Table 3: Most likely industry structures and corresponding cross-price elasticities: Price
competition with differentiated products.
1.3 Number of Firms
In contrast to the Kreps & Scheinkman (1983) model of capacity-constrained price com-
petition with homogenous products, our model of capacity-constrained price competition
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with differentiated products is easily extended from N = 2 to N > 2 firms. Table 4 lists the
five most likely size distributions along with their respective probabilities. The left panel
pertains to N = 2 firms, the middle panel to N = 3 firms, and the right panel to N = 4
firms. Throughout, we hold the degree of product differentiation fixed at γ = 0.9 and the
rate of depreciation at δ = 0.1. Note that our notion of a size distribution differs some-
what from the one of an industry structure or state. For example, the industry structures
(i, j) and (j, i) both give rise to the size distribution {i, j}. In general, a size distribution
encompasses all permutations of an industry structure and is thus invariant to a relabelling
of firms.
N = 2 N = 3 N = 4
distribution prob. distribution prob. distribution prob.
{1, 5} 0.32 {1, 1, 5} 0.33 {1, 1, 1, 4} 0.48
{2, 5} 0.24 {1, 2, 4} 0.20 {1, 1, 1, 3} 0.16
{1, 4} 0.15 {1, 1, 4} 0.14 {1, 1, 2, 4} 0.13
{2, 4} 0.11 {1, 2, 5} 0.12 {1, 1, 2, 3} 0.09
{3, 5} 0.06 {1, 2, 3} 0.05 {1, 1, 3, 4} 0.04
Table 4: Most likely size distributions along with their respective probabilities: Price com-
petition with differentiated products.
As can be seen from Table 4, with N > 2 firms, price competition still leads to firms
of unequal size. In general, the most likely industry structure consists of one medium-sized
and N − 1 small firms. Moreover, industry dynamics continue to resemble a preemption
race. Once a firm falls behind, it stops to invest, whereas its rivals continue to invest. In
short, firms drop out of the race one-by-one, thus propelling the last remaining firm into a
position of dominance.
1.4 Other Extensions and Robustness Checks
Below we briefly discuss two other extensions of the model, namely entry and exit and
demand uncertainty. We then argue that our results are robust to the chosen capacity grid.
To facilitate comparisons with earlier results, we return to the case of homogenous products.
Entry and Exit. Entry and exit can be incorporated in straightforward ways into our
model. Indeed, the situation considered in this paper can be interpreted as one in which,
although entry and exit are feasible, entry barriers are insurmountable (infinite setup costs)
and investments in capacity are completely sunk (zero salvage value).
On the other hand, some preliminary work indicates that our conclusions remain intact
with less extreme assumptions. To see this, consider the case of price competition and
positive depreciation. If exit is incorporated (positive salvage value), a firm that falls behind
its rival first stops investing and then exits the market. This adds value to becoming the
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dominant firm, and thus tends to make the preemption race more brutal. On the other hand,
the dominant firm is not free of all competitive pressures once the small firm has exited.
In fact, as long as entry is possible (small setup costs), the incumbent firm continues to
sustain high levels of capacity in order to ward off potential entrants. Hence, as in the model
without entry and exit, the large firm has to perpetually reinforce its dominant position.
Demand Uncertainty. The papers by Maggi (1996a), Gabszewicz & Poddar (1997),
and Reynolds & Wilson (2000) emphasize the role demand uncertainty plays in shaping
the structure of an industry. Demand uncertainty is easily incorporated in our model by
introducing demand states d ∈ {1, . . . , D} and specifying a demand function of the form
Q(P ) = ad − bdP . By choosing ad ≥ 0 and bd ≥ 0 appropriately, we are able to consider
a range of different forms of demand uncertainty, including isoelastic rotations of demand
around a constant choke-off price. The transition between demand states is governed by a
Markov process.
The first scenario we explored was demand growth. Since firms anticipate the ultimate
state of demand, their investment behavior in earlier demand states is similar to their
investment behavior in the ultimate demand state. Moreover, all demand states but the
ultimate are transitory. This in turn implies that the ergodic distribution is identical to the
one that results from an industry without demand uncertainty. In sum, demand growth
has no permanent impact on the structure of the industry.
We then turned to demand cycles. Compared to an industry without demand uncer-
tainty, firms invest more in the upswing of a demand cycle and less in the downswing.
Moreover, firms investment behavior is remarkably similar across demand states, again be-
cause firms anticipate the upcoming changes in demand. While the states in a demand cycle
are recurrent, the ergodic distribution is again similar across demand states. Compared to
an industry without demand uncertainty, the ergodic distribution is somewhat more spread
out due to the additional variability added by the demand uncertainty. In sum, if firms
compete in prices and investment is reversible, the industry ends up with one dominant
firm and one small firm in the presence of demand cycles. Hence, although demand cycles
have a lasting impact on the industry, they are relatively unimportant in comparison to the
forces unleashed by the competitive interactions among firms.
Capacity Grid. We have repeated our computations with a finer capacity grid. In par-
ticular, we set M = 19 with q0 = 0, q1 = 2.5, q2 = 5 up to q19 = 45 (instead of M = 10
with q0 = 0, q1 = 5, q2 = 10 up to q9 = 45). To keep the cost of adding a unit of capacity
comparable between the two parameterizations, we have increased α, the effectiveness of
investment, by 50%.
In case of quantity competition, the most likely long-run industry structures (in units of
capacity) are now (12.5, 12.5), (12.5, 12.5), (15, 15), and (15, 15) for δ = 0, 0.01, 0.1, 0.3. In
particular, firms now fail to make maximal profits from product market competition even
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with δ = 0. In other words, our earlier finding that the combined profits are maximal at the
steady-state (Section 3 of the paper) is an artifact of the capacity levels we use. Moreover,
the most likely long-run industry structures with δ = 0 and δ = 0.01 now coincide.
Turning to the case of price competition, the most likely long-run industry structures
are now (12.5, 12.5), (12.5, 12.5), (12.5, 20) and (20, 12.5), and (12.5, 25) and (25, 12.5) for
δ = 0, 0.01, 0.1, 0.3. Again, the most likely long-run industry structures with δ = 0 and
δ = 0.01 coincide. This is particularly striking in case of δ = 0.01, where our original
parameterization yielded (10, 25) and (25, 10) as the modes of the ergodic distribution. Note,
however, that while the most likely industry structure is symmetric, the ergodic distribution
also puts considerable mass on asymmetric structures: (12.5, 15) and (15, 12.5) each have
a probability of 0.18 and (10, 15) and (15, 10) each have a probability of 0.03, whereas
(12.5, 12.5) has a probability of 0.55. Finally, the gap between firms remains substantial in
case of δ = 0.1 and δ = 0.3.
In sum, small changes are magnified by the lumpiness of capacity. On the other hand,
the basic shape of the policy functions remains unchanged with a finer capacity grid. Conse-
quently, we continue to obtain preemption races and asymmetric industry structures under
capacity-constrained price competition and symmetric industry structures under quantity
competition.
2 Omitted Tables and Figures
• Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 3: Profits pi(i, j) from product market competition.
• Figures 4-11: Transition distribution after T = 5, 15, 25, 50 periods.
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Figure 1: Policy function x(i, j) and limiting distribution. Quantity competition with b = 20
(top panels) and b = 50 (bottom panels).
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Figure 2: Profits pi(i, j) from product market competition with differentiated products,
policy function x(i, j), and limiting distribution. Price competition with γ = 0.9 (top
panels) and γ = 0.7 (bottom panels).
0 1 2
3 4 5
6 7 8
9
01
23
45
67
89
0
20
40
ij
pi
(i,j
)
0 1 2
3 4 5
6 7 8
9
01
23
45
67
89
0
20
40
ij
pi
(i,j
)
Figure 3: Profits pi(i, j) from product market competition: Quantity competition (left panel)
and price competition (right panel).
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Figure 4: Transient distribution after T = 5 periods with initial state i0 = j0 = 1. Quantity
competition with δ = 0 (top left panel), δ = 0.01 (top right panel), δ = 0.1 (bottom left
panel), and δ = 0.3 (bottom right panel).
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Figure 5: Transient distribution after T = 15 periods with initial state i0 = j0 = 1. Quantity
competition with δ = 0 (top left panel), δ = 0.01 (top right panel), δ = 0.1 (bottom left
panel), and δ = 0.3 (bottom right panel).
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Figure 6: Transient distribution after T = 25 periods with initial state i0 = j0 = 1. Quantity
competition with δ = 0 (top left panel), δ = 0.01 (top right panel), δ = 0.1 (bottom left
panel), and δ = 0.3 (bottom right panel).
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Figure 7: Transient distribution after T = 50 periods with initial state i0 = j0 = 1. Quantity
competition with δ = 0 (top left panel), δ = 0.01 (top right panel), δ = 0.1 (bottom left
panel), and δ = 0.3 (bottom right panel).
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
01
23
45
67
89
0
0.2
0.4
i
δ=0.00
j
a i
j
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
01
23
45
67
89
0
0.1
0.2
i
δ=0.01
j
a i
j
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
01
23
45
67
89
0
0.05
0.1
i
δ=0.10
j
a i
j
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
01
23
45
67
89
0
0.05
0.1
i
δ=0.30
j
a i
j
Figure 8: Transient distribution after T = 5 periods with initial state i0 = j0 = 1. Price
competition with δ = 0 (top left panel), δ = 0.01 (top right panel), δ = 0.1 (bottom left
panel), and δ = 0.3 (bottom right panel).
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Figure 9: Transient distribution after T = 15 periods with initial state i0 = j0 = 1. Price
competition with δ = 0 (top left panel), δ = 0.01 (top right panel), δ = 0.1 (bottom left
panel), and δ = 0.3 (bottom right panel).
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Figure 10: Transient distribution after T = 25 periods with initial state i0 = j0 = 1. Price
competition with δ = 0 (top left panel), δ = 0.01 (top right panel), δ = 0.1 (bottom left
panel), and δ = 0.3 (bottom right panel).
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Figure 11: Transient distribution after T = 50 periods with initial state i0 = j0 = 1. Price
competition with δ = 0 (top left panel), δ = 0.01 (top right panel), δ = 0.1 (bottom left
panel), and δ = 0.3 (bottom right panel).
